In order to ensure the information security of a network, network security devices have been widely deployed in the information and communication network. Based on the monitoring data collected by network security equipment, network security administrators analyze whether there is an attacking incident or abnormal situation in the current network environment. However, if the original monitoring data collected by network security equipment is tampered with by the attacker, then network security administrators will make a wrong judgment and delay the best time to take protective actions. Therefore, the reliability and authenticity of data generated by network security devices are of the utmost importance. In this paper, we first define a revised Euclidean distance formula for the D-S evidence theory and propose a dual test method for the authenticity of data based on algebra statistics and geometric trends, detecting any malicious tampering on these monitoring data. Utilizing a web application firewall (WAF) device, we carry out a series of experiments to verify the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid is a typical cyber-physical system. The cyber attack cannot only invade the information technology network but also lead to irreversible damage to physical devices and systems. A series of attacking incidents in recent years have been seen as a constantly growing threat to the information and safety security of the power grid, such as cyber attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid in 2015 and 2016, causing widespread power outages. Moreover, in 2019, one of the most massive blackouts happened in Venezuela. Only five out of 23 states are unaffected in this incident. The streets of Caracas in Venezuela's capital were plunged into a massive traffic jam after the city's streets were plunged into darkness and the subway suddenly stopped running. Although there is no substantial evidence to prove that this attack is caused by The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Malik Najmus Saqib . hackers, it once again sounded the alarm on the information security and safety of the power grid.
In order to detect and avoid such malignant events occurring, a large number of network security devices, e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDS) and web application firewall (WAF), are deployed in the information and communication networks of the secondary power system. Either IDS or WAF can monitor all the network traffic in real-time and observe any abnormal situation. It is so convenient that network administrators can discover the security threat or attacking the incident promptly according to the data uploaded by these network security devices.
However, the judgment of network managers mainly depends on the reliability of monitoring data. Thereby making the authenticity of these IDS or WAF is usually of utmost importance. For example, once attackers manipulate the analyzed results of IDS or WAF, what do network administrators look is not the actual result of the network traffic, they will miss some intrusion incident and delay the best time for network security emergency response. These IDS or WAF will become a decoration.
To account for this, we need to check the authenticity of the collected information from IDS or WAF and must observe any unconventionality in the network all the time. The intuitive way to achieve this is to use message authentication codes (MAC), Hash message authentication codes (HMAC), or identity-based key establishment method. These methods are usually high computation and time consuming, which are not very suitable for the power grid.
Unlike the traditional cryptography methods, based on our previous work [1] , in this paper, we put forward a novel information authenticity scheme based on D-S Evidence Theory in a data tampered attacking scenario. The D-S theory [2] , aiming at dealing with the uncertainty of information, is modified to propose a processing method of mathematical statistics for data gathered from network security monitoring devices. In order to adapt this algorithm to verify the reliability of network equipment information, we propose an improved version of the D-S theory. Consequently, in this paper, we provide an efficient and feasible solution, called Double Correction of D-S Evidence Theory, to verify the correctness and reliability of network traffic monitoring devices. Our contributions are four-fold.
First of all, it is endowed with different weight depending on the degree of dispersion of the algebra distance [3] ; Secondly, the geometric trend matching of the gathered data is carried out via the grey correlation method, and the weights are given depending on the geometric trend of the overall data [4] , [5] ; Thirdly, the final processing result is worked out from the average value of the above two methods, and the standard variance processing is calculated on the raw data, so as to judge the rationality of the proposed method form theoretical aspect [6] ; Finally, a typical WAF device is used to corroborate our proposed method for information authenticity and show the availability of double correction of D-S Evidence Theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents preliminaries and states the basic principle of D-S Evidence Theory. Section III introduces our proposed schemes. In Section IV, real-world experimets are carried out to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of our information authenticity screening design. We discuss related work in Section V and Section VI is the conclusion on the whole paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. D-S EVIDENCE THEORY
D-S theory provides the method of reasoning on uncertain factors and regarding all the possibilities of an event as a recognition framework, donated as L, which consists of N mutually exclusive elements [2] L = {M 1 , M 2 , M 3 · · · M N }. Let M i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) be an element of recognition frame, N represent the total number TABLE 1. Summary of symbols and notation. of elements. The collection contains 2 N possible subsets, expressed in 2 L .
Definition 1: If L is the recognition framework [2] , for each subset M of L, the mapping F from 2 L to [0,1] is called the basic probability assignment functions, expressed with m, and must satisfy the conditions M (ϕ) = 0, M∈L m (M) = 1.
The letter m indicates the degree of support for each evidence element in the recognition framework [2] .
Definition 2: the fusion rules of D-S theory for different evidences are as follows [6] :
Among them,
The letter k represents the degree of conflict between different evidence bodies. It is obvious from the above formula that when k approximating to 1, the synthesis results are opposed to the basic facts and when k = 1, it is even unable to be synthesized. All the notations used in this paper are listed in table 1.
The most apparent drawback of D-S theory is that it will produce contradictions that are entirely contrary to reality when dealing with huge conflicts [8] , [9] . Therefore, we introduce the Euclidean formula, that is, the algebraic statistical method in this paper. This method can avoid this kind of defect of the D-S theory. The feasibility of using this theory to infer uncertainty evidence is supported by the literature [10] .
III. DOUBLE CORRECTION OF D-S EVIDENCE THEORY: A. ALGEBRA STATISTICS
As is known to all, D-S evidence theory demonstrates a great advantage in processing fuzzy information with less conflict, but it is going to be contrary to the reality when dealing VOLUME 7, 2019 with data with greater conflict [11] - [13] . Therefore, in order to expand its application in handling uncertain information, an amended one has been proposed to fit all uncertain information. The method can be described as follows: the revised Euclidean distance formula is used for mathematical statistics analysis of the data. On the basis of the degree of algebraic distance dispersion between the evidence, the method quantitatively describes changes between different data, and the closer the algebraic distance between the two data, the higher their complexity, and vice versa [14] .
Definition 3: Ł is the recognition framework, which contains n different propositions, and for both n-dimensional elements in the recognition framework:
Then, all the rows of the similarity matrix are added together to get the total weight of each evidence body in the recognition framework. The following step is to calculate the weights of each evidence body in row order respectively. Finally, the value of the total weight of each row is calculated, which is the credibility of each evidence body of the row. The formula is [15] :
This method combines the revised European distance formula with the D-S evidence theory, first from the perspective of mathematical statistics, ignoring the direction and development tendency of the whole evidence body in space. The algebraic distance between various evidence bodies is obtained [16] , and a method of statistical processing of fuzzy data is acquired.
B. GEOMETRICAL TREND MATCHING METHOD
The basic idea of grey correlation degree is to utilize the geometry shape of each curve sequence to judge its degree of similarity, suggesting that the closer each curve is with the other and the more consistent moving trend of each is, the more similar and reliable [17] , [18] . The first step is mapped the D-S theory into the grey correlation degree, and then all the original data are represented in the form of grey correlation degree. At last, the exception data are detected by observing the data trend of geometric matching.
Definition 4: given the behavior index sequence of X i is
The reference series X r = (x r1 , x r2 , x r3 , · · · , x rn ) is introduced with a series of non-dimensional behavioral indices
The correlation coefficient is daonated as:
in this formula:
ρ is the identification coefficient, aiming to avoid the distortion caused by τ being too large, and the identification coefficient varies inversely with the identification ability.
From the mapping procedure of D-S theory to, we can get the following definition.
Definition 5: Let the credibility is the sum of the correlation degree X * i , X * r of the index series:
The geometrical shape-based method uses the similarity between different evidence bodies as the weight of each evidence, which means that if Ł is the recognition frame, x i and x j (i = j) are arbitrary two elements of the set M 1 and M 2 , mapped to X * i and X * r as follows:
According to the above mapping relationship, a new index sequence is generated:
, · · · , m r (M N )) (15) A new correlation coefficient is derived from equation 9 by mapping, which is:
Among above equation, The function of the coefficient of friction ρ is to prevent distortion of Eq.16, because the distortion is due to 2 being too large. The creditability of the new recognition framework derived from definition 5 is:
At last, the algebraic method and the geometric method are combined to identify the development tendency of the whole evidence body, so as to obviate the misleading caused by the recursion of algebraic results.
This approach garantees the degree of discrete algebraic distance between data, also considers the general development tendency of the evidence body. The ultimate weight of the evidence body is determined by computing the average value of the above two methods after [19] , [20] , i.e.:
Here, as illustrated in figure 1, we present a network architecture with WAF, which is connected in parallel with the router, mainly to identify the abnormality by mirroring the traffic of the router port. The red circle in the figure represents the location of the data that was tampered with when implementing the Dos attack. The WAF can detect the following attacks, i.e., initial screening, path traversal attacks, HTTP protocol violations, command injection attacks, server information disclosure, Web server exploits, HTTP access control events, malicious scans, SQL injection attacks, illegal page content, and illegal file uploads, HTTP protocol violations, command injection attacks.
B. EXPERIMENT ONE
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to verify the correctness of the method provided in this paper without implementing an attack. Firstly, the original data (that is, the matrix 11) is analyzed by algebra and geometric methods. It is concluded that the server information vulnerability successfully attacked is greatest, followed by the resource theft vulnerability, and the Web server vulnerability is the least likely to be successfully attacked. Then, compared with the judgment result of the WAF, it was found that the results of the two were consistent.
To obtain sample data for research, Web Applicaton Firewall(WAF) monitors were set in real grid power grid environment, and the monitoring data from 8:00 am to 10:00 am on a specific day was collected. Considering the excessive amounts of data bars, we collected the attack vulnerabilities which were likely to appear in our daily work and emphatically analyzed at the same time here. These vulnerabilities are server information vulnerabilities, resource hotlinking, Web server vulnerability attacks, malicious scanning, and illegal page content, respectively.
Assuming that the prerequisite for a successful invasion is the establishment of a complete attack connection, the time interval length defined as [a, b] is two hours. In this experiment, we take the interval time as [9] , [11] . According to the calculation of each vulnerability index, the collected data all point to three primary attacks which were server information vulnerability, resource hotlinking, and Web server vulnerability, respectively.
A matrix on the risk of the above three types of loopholes was obtained by preprocessing all indicators:
It is explicit from the matrix (22) that in the time interval [9] , [11] , the second evidence shows impossibility of the server's information leak, but the other evidence is hovering around 0.5. For the intention of preventing the attacker from falsifying the data, cheating the monitoring equipment, we use the algebra statistics and geometric trends to determine the authenticity of the collected original data.
1) ALGEBRA STATISTICS METHOD
The raw data is primarily dealed with by algebra statistics, the degree of dispersion between the data algebra distance is calculated, and the weight value is listed as following Table 2 .
As shown from table 2, after the first fitting, there is the greatest potential of the resource hotlinking. In the second time, the risk of sever information vulnerability becomes the highest, and the risk of resource hotlinking and web server vulnerability diminishes. After the third fitting, the probability of server information loopholes still ranks top, and the probability of resource and web server vulnerability is lower than former one. After the fourth fitting, the probability value of server information vulnerability reaches the peak value compared to the previous three times, substantially higher than the probability of the other two.
After the four processing of the original data of server information vulnerability, the overall result has a tendency to increase, and the degree of dispersion is small. It is noteworthy that the maximum discrepancy between the adjacent probabilistic value reaches 0.43, and the final value is the greatest. These strong arguments indicate that there's a big chance happening for server information vulnerability; The total probability of the resource vulnerability inclines to decrease, the degree of dispersion is large, and the most significant difference between the adjacent probabilistic value is greater than 0.5. The infinitesimal probability of emergence can be obtained because of the huge difference manifested by each server information vulnerability evidence. Although more striking, the dispersion degrees of web server vulnerabilities take the minimal value, each of their fitting values is small. This suggests that the last fusion result is the most accurate so that the probability of emergence is higher than server information vulnerability but lower than resource hotlinking.
2) GEOMETRIC TREND METHOD
Then, the raw data is analyzed and processed using the geometric trend method. We can acknowledge the heterogeneity of the raw data by observing the overall variation tendency from following Table 3 .
As can be acquired from table 3, the result of the first fitting is consistance with that of algebra statistical method. After the second time, the probability of the server information vulnerability becomes lower than that of the resource hotlinking, and the possibility of the web server vulnerability is minimal. After the third fitting, the probability of server information vulnerability keeps rising while the resource hotlinking decreases by half compared to the second, and small fluctuation exsits in the probability of web server vulnerability; After the last processing, the probability value of server information vulnerability is also 0.6767, 0.4864, 0.2309 higher than the previous ones, respectively. The probability value of a resource hotlinking is also lower than the previous three times, and the value of a web server vulnerability is improved compared to the first time.
From the above data, it can be known that the four times processing results of algebra statistical method on server information vulnerability all take on ascend trend coinciding with the treatment of geometric trend method. The distinction lies in that the first method is growing faster than the second; The second method converges faster than the first one for resource hotlinking; The result of both treatment is not consistent with the result of each vulnerability, we here take the average value of both methods for the fake of the accuracy of the handling results. The fitting results of the fourth time are 0.8610, 0.0342, 0.1049, respectively.
3) VARIANCE VERIFYING THE FITTING RESULT
Finally, using variance to judge the accuracy of the results obtained, A ij refers to line i and column j of the original matrix, S i refers to the variance of line i, and x n represents column i of line n, x represents the average value of column and the results are obtained by the following formula:
Among this formula, the value of x 1 , x 2 , x 3 is 0.43,0.28,0.29, respectively. S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 and S 5 , in turn, is equal to 0.038, 0.2018, 0.0168, 0.0168 and 0.0168. The result shows S 1 < S 3 = S 4 = S 5 < S 2 , which indicates that the dispersion of A 1 in the matrix is the smallest, followed by A 3 , A 4 and A 5 , and A 2 ranks top. Figures 2 and 3 show that the experimental results are highly consistent with the theoretical calculations. The calculation result of our methods is 0.8575 > 0.0352 > 0.1073, which is completely consistent with the variance result. The comparison means that this method can completely exclude misleading data. It can also be verified from the processing results of WAF, as shown in figure 1 and figure 3 . Figure 3 is a risk distribution map about the events in an hour from the WAF overview menu. This map is an overview of a risk level automatically generated based on the distribution of events in Figure 1 and the WAF rule. Figure 3 lists three vulnerabilities with high to low risk levels, which are consistent with the results discussed in the methods provided here.
According to figure 2 , the events of server information, resource hotlinking and web server vulnerability amount to more than 520, 235 and 18, respectively. And malicious scanning and illegal file uploading attacks are minimal. The above information is highly consistent with the probability of occurrence calculated in this paper. Figure 3 shows that in the interval [9] , [10] , the new number of projects rises linearly per second, indicating the traffic anomaly and the flow is obviously the obstacle data.
C. EXPERIMENT TWO
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to show that the methods provided in this paper can still work in dealing with the data tampered by human beings in the WAF. The first half of Experiment 2 analyzes the falsified raw data through the theory provided here and the analysis results show that the risk of Web server vulnerability is the smallest while the second half is to analyze the tampered data through WAF and the results are inconsistent with the previous results. In fact, this set of data was deliberately modified by the experimenter who was familiar with the working mechanism, but WAF did not notice it. Therefore, the results obtained by WAF are wrong.
1) ALGEBRA STATISTICS METHOD
In the next experiment, the monitoring data was extracted from 11:00 am to 12:00 am on a certain day. After initial screening, path traversal attacks, HTTP protocol violations, command injection attacks, server information disclosure, Web server exploits, HTTP access control events, malicious scans, SQL injection attacks, illegal page content, and illegal file uploads, HTTP protocol violations, command injection attacks. In this experiment, a ij between time intervals [12] , [13] was taken as the weight of evidence to form a five-row and five-column attack behavior matrix. Among them, a1j represents the first evidence of Web server vulnerability attacks, malicious scanning, illegal file uploading, server information leakage and other attacks. Correspondingly, a2j, a3j, a4j and a5j represent the second, third, fourth and fifth evidence of the above, respectively; ai1 indicates that five pieces of evidence for Web server exploits have been collected. Correspondingly, ai2, ai3, ai4, and ai5 represent five pieces of evidence for malicious scanning, illegal file uploading, server information disclosure, and other attacks. The specific assignment is as shown in equation (24) . In order to intuitively observe the dispersion degree of each column evidence, the first, second, third, fourth and fifth pictures in Fig. 4 correspond to the evidence of ai1, ai2, ai3, ai4 and ai5 in equation (15) , respectively. It is easy to draw from Fig. 3 that among the five pieces of evidence for Web server exploits, the first, third, fourth, and fifth pieces of evidence are centered at 0.15, floating within the range of 0.05. However, the second piece of evidence has a sudden change, indicating that the probability is zero, which is obviously contrary to the other four pieces of evidence.
For the purpose of further using the scientific method to effectively identify each potential attack, similarly, the original data is firstly fitted by the algebraic statistical processing method. Since N-1 results can be obtained by fitting N pieces of evidence, four fitting results were obtained in this experiment, as shown in Table 3 . In the five pieces of evidence given about Web server vulnerabilities, the fitting results are 0.0444, 0.0396, 0.0281, and 0.0130, respectively. Obviously, the fitting result is gradually reduced, showing a decreasing trend, and the fitting results of the adjacent two are respectively different by 0.0048, 0.0115 and 0.0151. The difference between them is very small, indicating that the degree of dispersion is low and the data is stable. To some extent, the analysis results show that the possibility of Web server vulnerabilities is low; From the fitting results of the malicious scan, it is observed that the whole tendency is increased firstly and then decreased. The result of the last calculation is very close to the first one and the difference between the two values is 0.0117, showing the probability of occurrence is slightly higher than that of the former.
The overall trend of the file illegal uploading results is the same as the malicious scan. The second result is 0.0884 worse than the first one and grows rapidly. Compared to the last calculation of the malicious scan, the illegal upload of the file is 0.0019 higher than it. In terms of numerical values, the two are very close, so the probability of occurrence of both is also equivalent;
Server information disclosure is exactly the same as the overall trend of malicious scanning and file illegal uploading vulnerabilities. The difference between the two is that the result of the server information leaking is much larger than the former two. The last calculation results confirm this speculation again, and the possibility of the attack is also much higher than the previous three;
For other threats, the overall fitting trend is firstly decreased and then increased. The third fitting result once fell to the bottom, and the fourth rebounded again. Compared with the first four attacks, other attacks are higher than the previous ones, so they have the highest probability of occurrence.
2) GEOMETRIC TREND METHOD
To further proofread the calculation results of algebraic statistics, the geometric processing method was introduced in the experiment to fit the above evidence. It is easy to understand from Table 4 that the first fitting result for the five threats is consistent with the algebraic statistical method. The overall trend for Web server vulnerabilities is diminishing, with a slight rebound in the fourth processing result, which ultimately takes a value of 0.0284; For malicious scanning, the overall trend is increasing, and the growth between each item is more obvious, with a peak of 0.3032 in the fourth processing result; Regarding the threat of illegal uploading of documents, the overall trend is consistent with the former, and the difference between each item also fluctuates within the range of 0.049; The difference from the first three threats is that the change in server information leakage is increased in the first place and then decreased. At the same time, a peak and bottom value appear at the third and fourth times, respectively; Observing other threats, the fitting results are also different from the top four threats. The overall trend is primarily reduced and then increased from the first maximum to the last 0.2214. Based on the fourth fitting value of these five threats, the probability of malicious scanning is the highest, the order is malicious scanning, illegal file uploading, other threats, server information leakage and web server vulnerability threats according to the probability of occurrence.
According to equation (8), the calculation results of the above two methods are averaged. As shown in Fig. 4 , the black and blue lines in each picture represent the processing results of algebraic statistics and geometric methods, respectively. Besides, the red line represents the average of the two calculated using equation (8) . The order in the figure is Web server vulnerabilities, malicious scans, illegal file uploads, server information leaks, and other threats. It can be clearly seen from Fig. 4 that the fourth fitting result of the two methods has the opposite trend in the first, second, and the third picture, indicating that there is a large conflict. Therefore, we mitigate conflict by seeking an average. It is worth mentioning that the fourth fitting results of the fourth and fifth picture tend to increase. The average of the last fitting results for each type of threat is 0.0207, 0.23465, 0.20815, 0.24635, and 0.29015, respectively, indicating that the probability of occurrence in turn is other threats, server information disclosure, malicious scanning, file illegal uploading, and web server exploits. Moreover, the probability of an attack occurring is also positively correlated with the above arrangement.
3) DISCUSSION OF CONFLICT FACTOR
In addition to discussing the fitting results, the conflict factor is also an important reference factor. The black and red lines in the last picture in Fig. 5 represent the four conflicting factors of the algebraic statistics and geometric methods, respectively, and the blue lines represent the average of the two. It can be clearly seen from Fig. 5 that the conflict factors of the two methods are both increasing firstly and then decreasing. This phenomenon indicates that there is a positive correlation between the results obtained by the two methods. The conflict factor is centered around 0.7832, which also explains the appropriate fusion of the two methods from another angle.
The first five figures in Figure 5 are the fitting results of four times about Web server vulnerability attacks, Malicious scanning, Illegal file uploading, Server information leakage and Other attacks by algebra, geometric and average method, respectively. The black, red, and blue lines represent algebra, geometry, and average fit results, respectively. The purpose of Figure 5 is to more intuitively observe the correlation between the two methods, as described in the original text. The sixth plot in Figure 5 shows the conflict coefficients in each algebra, geometry, and average fit process, and the conflict coefficients in the graph are also positively correlated.
The above discussion takes the actual evidence as input and uses the theoretical method to discuss in detail. Below we compare the inferred results with the results in WAF. Fig. 6 shows the possibility of all threats before uncategorized: Path crossing attack is the most likely, followed by HTTP protocol violation, while SQL injection attack, Page illegal content, and Illegal upload of files are the least likely to occur. A total of 10 attacks are presented in Figure 6 . According to the classification of the Experiment two, it can be divided into five categories: Web server vulnerability, Malicious scanning, Illegal file uploading, Server information leakage and Other attacks (that is, Path traversal attacks, HTTP protocol violations, command injection attacks, HTTP access control events, SQL injection attacks, and Page illegal content). Therefore, Figure 6 shows the detection results of the attacks.
As can be seen from the prediction results of WAF showed in Fig. 7 , the order of attack probability from large to small is followed by other threats, server information disclosure, Web server vulnerability attacks, malicious scanning, and illegal file uploading. We found that the Web server vulnerability attack is different from the WAF prediction result. The theoretical result is that the Web server vulnerability attack probability is the smallest, while the WAF believes that the probability of occurrence is large. To further explore the real cause, we start with the core router and check the raw data uploaded to the WAF. Finally, it was discovered that the experimenter personally modified the input data of the WAF, which again illustrates the reliability of the theoretical method here.
V. RELATED WORK
To account for the similarity collision problem, a new combination rule for evidence theory is proposed in [22] . Via the basic probability assignment sorting, the evidence weights are reduced observably. In order to solve the problem of traditional DS methods, which weigh each feature equally in the classification process, based on the analytical hierarchy process (AHP), a method is proposed to calculate the weight of features [23] . Based on a decision making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) model, a new time series data fusion algorithm is proposed in [24] . The mass function of the empty set is determined based on a minimum spanning tree [25] . Based on DS evidence theory, A DDoS attack situation information fusion method is proposed in [26] . Employing DS evidence theory, the entropy and failed connection attempt by port scanning attacker are used to detect port scanning attack [27] . A privacy and availability data clustering scheme is proposed to enhance the selection of the initial center points for the sensing devices in the Internet of Things [28] . To authorize the deduplication for multimedia data, a novel role symmetric encryption algorithm and a RSE-based proof of ownership (RSE-PoW) scheme are proposed [29] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, in order to resist malicious tampering on monitoring data, a revised Euclidean distance formula for the D-S evidence theory called Double Correction of D-S Evidence theory is proposed in this paper. And we give a dual test method for the authenticity of data based on both algebra statistics and geometric trends. The original data of a security device was processed by the modified method and grey relational degree method. The average value of the two methods was taken as the final processing result, and the correctness of the calculated results was judged by means of variance. Comparing the monitoring results of a WAF with the treatment results, it shows that our proposed method can eliminate the disturbed data to the greatest extent and ensure the reliability and authenticity of data generated by WAF.
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